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GUARANTEE AND LOAN RECEIPT AGREEMENTS
IN MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION
ERNEST B. LAGESON*
INTRODUCTIONA S LONG as cases have been tried, attorneys have sought ways
to lessen the risks of litigation to their clients, if not avoid
them entirely. Over the years, innumerable private arrangements
have been designed and statutory provisions developed to dispose
of cases without the risk of trial. The covenant not to sue, the
covenant not to execute, partial release, full release, and other
procedures have long been part of the trial attorney's arsenal of
weapons in the ongoing struggle to protect his client from litigation.
In addition, methods of shifting the responsibility of payment to
others have been conceived. Although no right of contribution
among joint tort feasors existed at common law, such a rule has
been adopted by statute in approximately thirty-five jurisdictions.'
Theories of indemnity, both express and implied, have been devel-
oped and are in common use today.
In recent years we have witnessed the creation of new devices
and new uses of old devices which were not available to parties
under traditional rules and procedures. The emergence of the so-
called guarantee or Mary Carter agreement and, to a lesser extent,
the use of the long established loan receipt agreement, have pre-
sented courts with new and unique problems. Basically, these
* B.S., University of California at Berkeley; LL.B., University of California-
Boalt Hall. Mr. Lageson is a partner in the San Francisco firm of Bronson, Bron-
son & McKinnon.
I See statutes and cases collected at Note, Contribution and Indemnity in Cali-
fornia, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 490, 499-500 nn.56 & 57 (1969) and the following re-
cent codifications: ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010 (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE § 6-803
(Supp. 1973); KA. STAT. ANN. § 60-2413 (Supp. 1974); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. 5 93-8108 (Supp. 1973); ORE. REV. STAT. § 18.430 (1971); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 15-4-1 (Supp. 1973); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-7.3 (Supp. 1973).
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agreements are simply other ways of accomplishing the long exist-
ing goal of reducing the risks inherent in litigation. Because of the
methods employed in some of these accords, including the use of
secret covenants and the potential for collusive and misleading
conduct, such agreements have become the center of controversy.
In addition, many of them create issues of ethics, morality, and
the integrity of the adversary system.
The cases that have considered these agreements have raised
numerous questions regarding their effect. Do they promote collu-
sion between the agreeing parties? Do such agreements violate
established rules regarding contribution among joint tort feasors?
What ethical and/or moral considerations are involved? Is there
a coercive effect? Do these agreements reduce litigation or do they
foster it? Do they amount to the common law offenses of champerty
or maintenance? By analyzing the decisions chronologically, it is
possible to trace the development of the law regarding such agree-
ments and form some conclusions regarding the future.
It has been stated that there are as many agreements as there
are ingenious trial counsel; however, they fall into two categories:
a guarantee agreement, which calls for the guarantee of a specific
sum to the plaintiff -by one or more, but not all the defendants,,
with payment dependent upon the success or failure of the plaintiff
against the non-agreeing defendant, and loan receipt agreements,
which include an interest-free loan by one or more, but not all
defendants, repayment to be made out of the recovery from the
non-agreeing party.
I. GUARANTEE AGREEMENTS
As defined in this presentation, guarantee agreements involve a
multi-party situation in which one or more defendants guarantee
the plaintiff a specific dollar amount. If the verdict is against the
plaintiff, the guaranteed amount will be paid. If the verdict is in
the plaintiff's favor for less than the guaranteed figure, payment
will be made to make the plaintiff's recovery equal the guarantee.
The plaintiff agrees that if there is a verdict equal to or greater than
the amount of the guarantee, execution will be against the non-
agreeing defendant(s) and no payment will be required by the
guaranteeing defendant(s). The guaranteeing defendant may re-
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main in the case through trial or receive a dismissal before or
during trial.
Probably the earliest case in which the elements of guarantee
appeared was in the California decision of Pellett v. Sonotone' In
that case, the plaintiff purchased a hearing aid from the defendant
Sonotone through one of its salesmen, Brown. A mold of plaintiff's
ear had to be made and Brown arranged with defendant, Compton,
a dentist, to do this work. Compton, working under the direction
of Brown, prepared a plaster cast of the plaintiff's ear, however,
he failed to remove all of the plaster. This resulted in injury to the
plaintiff and litigation followed.
An agreement between Compton and the plaintiff called for the
payment of $5.00 by Compton regardless of the outcome of the
trial, and a $10.00 payment if there was a verdict in plaintiff's
favor. The agreement was not to be filed or revealed to the other
defendants and Compton was to remain in the case through trial.
Plaintiff appealed from a directed verdict.
Insofar as the guarantee agreement was concerned, the question
before the court was whether it constituted a release of Compton
and, therefore, amounted to a release of all defendants. The agree-
ment was unique to the California Supreme Court at that time and
they concluded it was more "akin to a covenant not to sue than a
release."3 It, therefore, did not constitute a release of the other
defendants.
While not called upon to determine its validity, the court, by
dicta, expressed its disapproval of the provision of the agreement
requiring Compton to continue in the action as a defendant when
he had no stake in the outcome. The court also criticized the
secrecy involved. Noting that the trial court found no fraud and
that all of the parties were apprised of the agreement prior to trial
(the agreement was revealed during the second trial but not during
the first), the court pointed out the potential danger of concealing
the true position of one of the defendants.
In a vigorous dissent Justice Roger Traynor defined the arrange-
ment as a "collusive proceeding" with "immoral consideration.'"
'26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945).
3 Id. at 787.
4 Id. at 789.
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He argued that the plaintiff should be bound by the agreement with
Compton and not be permitted to pursue a separate cause against
Sonotone and its salesmen for the same negligent acts from which
Compton was released.
More than twenty years passed before another appellate decision
in a guarantee-type case appeared. In 1967, the now famous
Florida case of Booth v. Mary Carter? was decided. The heirs of
decedent Elsie Booth brought an action against the Willoughby
Trucking Company and the Mary Carter Paint Company as a
result of a two-truck, auto accident that caused Mrs. Booth's death.
Prior to trial, the defendant Willoughby and the plaintiffs entered
into an agreement limiting Willoughby's exposure to $12,500. If
the verdict exceeded $37,500, the plaintiff would satisfy the verdict
against Mary Carter only. If the verdict was less than $37,500,
again the satisfaction would be against Mary Carter, but Wil-
loughby agreed to pay up to $12,500 to make the recovery total
$37,500. Finally, if there was a verdict for the defense, Willoughby
agreed to pay $12,500. It was also provided that the agreement
would not be revealed to the other defendants except by order of
the-court. Willoughby continued as a defendant in the case although
neither the jury nor the court was advised of the arrangement
limiting its exposure.
Following a plaintiff's verdict for $15,000 against both de-
fendants, Mary Carter sought a setoff on the theory that the agree-
ment constituted a release. The trial court denied the motion and
this denial was affirmed on appeal. Without citing any cases in
support of their ruling, the Florida court held that the agreement
was what it appeared to be, a guarantee. There was no discussion
of the points which caused the California court such grave doubts
in Pellett v. Sonotone.!
The next stage in guarantee law came with the 1971 decision of
Bill Currie Ford v. Cash.! There the court upheld an agreement
similar to that in the Mary Carter case and affirmed the
trial judge's sound refusal to allow the non-settling defendant to
introduce before the jury the contents of such an agreement ....
202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. App. 1967).
626 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945).
'252 So. 2d 407 (Fla. App. 1971).
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Admission of the settlement agreement would have prejudiced the
settling defendant and was properl excluded.!
The court was not impressed with the argument that the agreement
led to collusion, which was demonstrated by the fact that the
guaranteeing defendant did not cross-examine any of the plaintiff's
medical witnesses. Noting simply that the law favors settlement
of disputes out of court, the District Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.
By these two decisions, the Florida court firmly established the
validity of guarantee agreements which contemplate continuing the
agreeing defendant as a party but without the jury knowing the
true position of the parties, including the agreeing defendant's
desire to maximize plaintiff's recovery.
In Ponderosa Timber & Clearing Company v. Emrich,' a secret
guarantee agreement came to the attention of the Nevada Supreme
Court, but its validity was not at issue. The trial court had already
set the agreement aside and ordered partial satisfaction on the
ground the parties had misrepresented the status of settlement to
the court. On appeal, the court was asked to determine whether,
in the face of such an arrangement, the other defendants received
a fair trial. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's determina-
tion that there had been a fair trial, although the dissenting Justices
argued the agreement violated the adversary process and deprived
appellants of a fair hearing.
The following year the Nevada Supreme Court faced the issue
of the validity of such agreements in the landmark decision of Lum
v. Stinnett.'0 Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Gunderson
harshly criticized the arrangement and held it constituted champ-
erty and was void as against public policy.
The Lum case was a medical malpractice action involving the
alleged misreading of x-ray photographs and failure to properly
diagnose 'a spinal fracture. During the trial the family physician,
Romeo, and the hospital resident, Greene, entered into an agree-
ment with plaintiff calling for a guarantee of $20,000 and, in the
event of a verdict of $20,000 or more against the radiologist, Lum,
'Id. at 407.
0 86 Nev. 625, 472 P.2d 358 (1970).
10 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
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plaintiff would not execute against Greene or Romeo. Plaintiff also
agreed not to oppose a motion for directed verdict by the two.
The plaintiff covenanted to prosecute vigorously the case against
Dr. Lum and not settle for less than $20,000 but urge the jury to
return a verdict in excess of $20,000. At the conclusion of the
evidence Romeo and Greene were dismissed and the case went to
the jury as to the defendant Lum alone. Lum's attorney was
thwarted in his efforts to have the jury apprised of the agreement.
The agreement was not offered into evidence, however, apparently
due to numerous prejudicial statements in the document placing
all responsibility on Dr. Lum.
The court reversed, reinstating the cause of action against
Greene and Romeo and awarding a new trial. The court declared
that the irregularities in the proceeding so warped the presentation
of the case as to deny Lum a fair trial. The agreement was im-
proper and called for improper conduct by all of the attorneys
concerned. The basis of the holding appears to be that the agree-
ment constituted maintenance and champerty.
It is arguable that the court was erroneous in its reasoning on
the question of maintenance and champerty and there is contrary
authority in other jurisdictions."1 The opinion defined maintenance
as intermeddling by a person "without interest in a suit"" by as-
sisting either party with money or otherwise to prosecute or defend
it. The insurers of Romeo and Greene were strangers to the action
and, as the authors of the agreement, had committed the common
law offense of maintenance. Since the insurance carriers were to
profit from the recovery of the plaintiff, the court concluded their
conduct also amounted to champerty.
It is difficult to accept the conclusion that the insurers in this
case had no interest since presumably they would satisfy any
judgment against Greene and Romeo. Nonetheless, the court
reasoned that the insurers had no interest in the subject matter
and relied for that conclusion on a discovery case, Washoe County
Board of School Trustees v. Pirhala.2 In the Pirhala case, a casualty
insurer had resisted production of a liability policy during dis-
"See Cullen v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 211 Kan. 368, 507
P.2d 353 (1973).
Ild. at __, 507 P.2d at 350.
1184 Nev. 1, 435 P.2d 756 (1968).
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covery, and the Nevada court had ruled, in accordance with the
arguments of the carrier, that the policy was not discoverable. The
Lum court interpreted this position taken by a casualty insurer
regarding the discoverability of their policy as tantamount to urging
that it had no interest in the litigation.
A second and more cogent argument set forth in Lum con-
demned agreements calling for a defendant's attorney to participate
in litigation when he is actually interested in enhancing the
plaintiff's recovery. To do so, the court held, violated standards
of ethics and professional conduct.14 Because the jury was given
the false impression that Greene and Romeo were adverse to the
plaintiff when in reality they were not, a fair trial was not possible.
The court was not moved by the fact that the agreement was
revealed to the other party, pointing out:
It is no answer to say appellant was not stabbed in the back. If
his hands were tied, it matters little that he could see the blow
coming."
The court believed that adversary proceedings should be candid
and cited as authority decisions of the Arizona Bar Association
Ethics Committee." It was considerations of ethics, fairness, and
the integrity of the adversary process that the court stressed rather
than technical rules.
Five months after the Nevada Supreme Court's pronouncement
in Lum, including their reliance on the Arizona Bar Association
Ethics Committee reports, the Arizona Court of Appeals con-
sidered the question of guarantee agreements in City of Glendale
v. Bradshaw.' That case involved a one-car accident which injured
a passenger who sued the driver and the City of Glendale. During
the course of the trial, it became apparent that a guarantee agree-
ment adverse to the city existed and the terms were eventually
divulged. According to the agreement, the driver was to pay the
plaintiff $50,000 in the event of a defense verdict or a verdict
against the driver only, but to pay nothing if the verdict was against
:4 Lum v. Stinnett, supra note 10, at 352, n.7.
1a Id. at 352.
16 Op. No. 70-18, Ariz. State Bar Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct
(1970).
17 16 Ariz. App. 348, 493 P.2d 515 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 108 Ariz.
582, 503 P.2d 803 (1972).
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the city or both defendants. The jury returned a verdict against
both defendants in the amount of $280,000. On appeal, the trial
court was affirmed.
. Although critical of such arrangements, and specifically declar-
ing they were not expressing their approval of this type of agree-
ment, the court nevertheless refused to declare it in violation of
public policy. The court also recognized the merit in the argument
that such agreements foster collusive action with the attendant
danger of fraud, but the court was impressed by the fact that the
agreement was revealed to the trial judge and adverse parties as
well as the fact that there was no finding below of fraud or col-
lusion. The agreement was upheld on the authority of Damron v.
Sledge,8 which held that an assignment by an insured defendant
to the plaintiff of his rights against his insurance carrier for bad
faith refusal to defend and his subsequent default in the injury
action did not amount to collusion.
The agreement in City of Glendale differed from those involved
in prior cases in that the amount to be paid by the guaranteeing
defendant did not vary depending on the verdict against the re-
maining defendant. The agreement provided that a specific amount
was to be paid in the event of a verdict against the driver and no
payment in the event of a verdict against the city. Missing, there-
fore, was the motive by the agreeing defendant to assist the plaintiff
in increasing the verdict against the non-agreeing defendant.
During the same month in which the Glendale decision was
rendered, the Arizona Supreme Court considered the question in
City of Tucson v. Gallagher." Employing rather naive reasoning,
the court upheld the guarantee agreement without citing City of
Glendale, but in reliance upon Damron v. Sledge."
Again, the passenger, who had been injured in a one-car acci-
dent, sued the driver and city. The driver's limits of $10,000 were
inadequate and, to avoid expense and an excess judgment, the
policy limits were tendered. For tactical reasons, the plaintiff did
not wish to proceed to trial against the city alone, so it was agreed
he would have the option to accept the $10,000 and release the
18 105 Ariz. App. 151, 460 P.2d 997 (1968).
19 108 Ariz. 140, 493 P.2d 1197 (1972).
20 105 Ariz. App. 151, 460 P.2d 997.
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driver at any time; until the option was exercised, however, the
driver would remain in the case as a defendant. The plaintiff agreed
that if a judgment against the city exceeded $10,000, no attempt
would be made to collect from the driver; but if the judgment was
for less than $10,000, the driver's insurance carrier would pay the
difference. The trial resulted in a $33,000 verdict.
In responding to the defendant city's argument that the agree-
ment prevented a fair trial, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that
it was unable to see how the agreement could change either the
driver's motive or his trial tactics in that the
only difference is that he would be motivated in seeing that any
iudgment obtained by the plaintiff against the city would exceed
$10,000.21
The court further found no significance in the fact that the agreeing
defendant did not cross-examine the plaintiff or her medical wit-
nesses and simply dismissed this point with a statement, "We know
of no rule of law requiring cross-examination."" The situation that
had produced such vigorous condemnation by the Nevada Supreme
Court in Lum caused the Arizona Supreme Court no difficulty
whatsoever. The court in Gallagher did note that the appeal before
it was not concerned with the ethics of counsel, but that even if it
were, there was no showing that the agreement was unethical.
Although the most recent Arizona decision, Hemet Dodge v.
Gryder,2 ' expressed concern over the rule, the court continued to
uphold such agreements. It did so on the authority of Tucson
v. Gallagher, while at the same time acknowledging that these
agreements "border on collusion and tend to mislead judges and
juries."' None of the Arizona cases deal directly with the subject
of the admissibility of the agreements or how the jury is to be
instructed. Severance was discussed in Hemet Dodge, although the
court rejected the argument that the non-agreeing defendant was
entitled to severance as a matter of law. Severance was discretionary
and in that particular case no abuse was found.
The first Florida cases following the Lum decision to consider
21 493 P.2d at 1200.
22 d.
223 Ariz. App. 523, 534 P.2d 454 (1975).24 d. at -, 534 P.2d at 460-61.
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the problem were Ward v. Ochoa5 and Maule Industries v. Roun-
tree' which were decided on the same day. In the Maule case, the
Florida Supreme Court noted with approval the district court's
refusal to hold such agreements against public policy. The latter
had considered the question in light of "the well reasoned decision
of... Lum v. Stinnett""7 and rejected the public policy argument.
The supreme court accepted without reservation the lower court's
refusal to hold Mary Carter agreements void. In reliance on Ward
v. Ochoa, however, the court did hold that such agreements were
the subject of discovery and were admissible in evidence at trial.
Ward v. Ochoa was concerned not with the validity of such an
agreement, but its discoverability and admissibility. Stating that
such secret agreements tend to mislead judges and juries and border
on collusion, the court sought to prevent such deception stating:
To prevent such deception, we are compelled to hold that such
agreements must be produced for examination before trial. 8
Stressing that the search for truth in order to afford justice to the
litigrants was the primary duty of the courts, the court firmly
established that to deny the adverse party access to the agreement
or deny its admissibility at the time of trial constituted prejudicial
error. The Florida Supreme Court also directed that the trial court
give consideration to severance if requested to do so, although
noting the non-agreeing party was not entitled to severance as a
matter of law.
Although in these recent decisions the Florida courts declined
to hold the agreement void, a vastly more liberal view was ex-
pressed. They stressed the fact that the trial judge must approach
these agreements with a view to accomplishing what is fair to all
parties and must beware of collusion. Not specifically referred to
were the procedural questions of how best to apprise the jury of
such agreements. Since many of the agreements contain language
highly prejudicial to the non-agreeing party, he may be reluctant
to offer it into evidence. Although these points were not dealt with
in the decisions, the court's preoccupation with the possible evils of
284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
26284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973).
27 1 d. at 447.
28284 So. 2d at 387.
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such agreements suggests a rule permitting either edited versions of
the agreement being admitted or instructions by the court describing
the arrangement without the prejudicial language coming to the
jury's attention.
Although several subsequent lower court decisions in Florida
have dealt with the Mary Carter agreement, they have simply
reiterated the earlier holdings that these agreements are subject to
discovery and admissible."
The most recent pronouncements on the subject are in the
Arizona case of Hemet Dodge v. Gryder, ° and the California
decision of Pease v. Beech."' The Pease case involved, among other
issues, a guarantee during trial but including dismissal of the
guaranteeing defendants as soon as the agreement was consum-
mated. The case then continued against the non-agreeing defen-
dants. Compensatory verdicts in the five consolidated death actions
amounted to $4,497,000 and punitive verdicts totalled $17,250,-
000. The guarantee arrangement was affirmed on appeal. The
agreement, at least as to the minor plaintiffs, had been approved by
the trial judge so the court on appeal rejected any contentions of
fraud. Since no secrecy was involved and the agreeing defendants
were dismissed, none of the problems of the earlier Sonotone case
were present. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
jury should have been advised of the agreement, noting that the
defendant has no right to advise the jury of settlement by a co-
defendant.
II. LOAN RECEIPT AGREEMENTS
Although accomplishing basically the same result as a guarantee
agreement, the loan receipt agreement includes the contemporane-
ous payment of money to the plaintiff. Typically, funds are ad-
vanced in the form of an interest-free loan to the plaintiff by the
agreeing defendant with repayment to be made only from the pro-
29 See Imperial Elevator Co., Inc. v. Cohen, 311 So. 2d 732 (Fla. App. 1975);
Parish v. Armstrong, 302 So. 2d 767 (Fla. App. 1974); General Portland Land
Development Co. v. Stevens, 291 So. 2d 250 (Fla. App. 1974); Kuhns v. Fenton,
.288 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1974); Weinstein v. National Car Rentals, 288 So. 2d 509
(Fla. App. 1974).
10 23 Ariz. App. 523, 534 P.2d 454.
,' 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (4th Dist. 1974).
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ceeds of a verdict against the non-agreeing defendant. In the event
of a defendant's verdict, no repayment is necessary. In addition,
various controls may be placed on the plaintiff's right to settle
either in terms of the amount he may accept from the non-agreeing
parties or the right of the agreeing party to approve or disapprove
settlement.
One of the earliest examples of a loan receipt agreement being
utilized in a personal injury case was in Bolton v. Zeigler,' a
United States district court decision interpreting Iowa law. The
action arose out of a three-car accident among the plaintiffs' ve-
hicle, a truck owned by the Denver-Chicago Trucking Company,
and an automobile driven by Zeigler. Prior to any suit being insti-
tuted, the insurer for the trucking company and plaintiffs' attorney
entered into an agreement for an interest-free loan to each of the
two plaintiffs to be repaid out of the proceeds of any recovery from
defendant Zeigler. Plaintiffs further agreed not to sue the trucking
company. Thereafter, suit was filed against Zeigler only. By various
pre-trial motions Zeigler challenged the agreement and sought,
among other things, dismissal of the action, claiming a general
release or a pro tanto reduction of any verdict against him.
In a lengthy opinion tracing the history of loan receipt agree-
ments, the district court concluded that the loan receipt agreement
was contrary to the Iowa rule against contribution among joint
tort feasors. The court held that the agreement, in fact, called for
contribution in favor of the defendant trucking company out of
any verdict in the plaintiffs' favor against Zeigler. Rejecting
Zeigler's contention that the agreement amounted to a general
release, the court ruled it was a covenant not to sue, thus allowing
a pro tanto reduction in any eventual verdict against Zeigler, and
thereby destroying the effectiveness of the agreement.
The first reported instance of a loan receipt agreement in which
the lending party remained an active participant in the litigation
was Northern Indiana Public Service Company (NIPSCO) v. Otis.u
Plaintiff was injured in a gas explosion in downtown Fort Wayne,
Indiana, and sued the utility, NIPSCO, and the installing con-
tractor, Dehner. In the agreement between NIPSCO and the plain-
32 11 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Iowa 1953).
"145 Ind. App. 159, 250 N.E.2d 378 (1969).
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tiff, NIPSCO loaned $50,000 interest free to be repaid out of the
verdict, if any, ultimately obtained against Dehner. Only in the
event of a verdict against NIPSCO alone would their obligation
exceed the $50,000 interest-free loan. In the event of a joint judg-
ment, execution would be against Dehner only, the first $50,000
being repaid to NIPSCO. NIPSCO remained in the litigation and
the jury returned a verdict of $235,000 against both defendants.
The validity of the loan receipt agreement became an issue when
Dehner contended that the trial court erred in denying his request
for separate trials. The granting of a separate trial or motion to
sever was discretionary with the trial court and the appellate court
found no abuse of this discretion. Although the appellate court
could have stopped there, it went on to discuss the validity of loan
receipt agreements generally and comment on some of the authori-
ties cited by the parties. The court did not address itself to questions
of possible collusion or unfairness, although it did note that the
agreement was not offered in evidence by defendant Dehner. Review
of the prejudicial language of the agreement, however, makes it
clear why Dehner did not offer it into evidence. "
In direct contrast to the Bolton case, the court in NIPSCO ac-
cepted the fact that the loan agreement was a device to evade the
Indiana rule of no contribution among joint tort feasors. The
court believed that the policy of the law favoring settlement out-
weighed any considerations relating to violation of existing con-
tribution rules. The NIPSCO court came to this conclusion despite
the fact that the agreement did not settle the case, but was merely
the prelude to a lengthy trial and appeal. Furthermore, the terms
of the agreement did not even settle the case as to NIPSCO under
all circumstances since it was possible for the jury to return a
verdict against them in excess of $50,000, in which case, NIPSCO
would be obligated to satisfy the full judgment.
The following year the Indiana Supreme Court considered loan
31 The agreement between NIPSCO and the plaintiff recited that the parties
thereto agreed that Dehner was primarily liable to plaintiff and NIPSCO would
be entitled to indemnity from Dehner for any monies it paid in settlement. The
parties also agreed that Dehner had pursued a policy of delay in the litigation in-
cluding filing of frivolous pleadings, manifesting a defiant attitude toward the
rules of court and other misconduct. Finally, the parties recognized that Dehner
was one of the largest contractors in the area and financially able to pay sub-
stantially more than the prayer of the complaint without any financial impairment
to Dehner.
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receipt agreements in American Transport Company v. Central
Indiana Railway,' a case in which the loan agreement was con-
summated after trial and entry of judgment. One of the joint judg-
ment debtors made an interest-free loan to the plaintiff to be repaid
out of the proceeds of the judgment, if any, realized in a post-
trial appeal by the plaintiff against the co-defendants. Citing the
NIPSCO decision, the court stressed the desirability to the injured
party of loan receipt agreements in that substantial sums can be
placed in the hands of the injured party immediately, rather than
after prolonged legal struggles during which the plaintiff's situation
may change, litigants may die, or other changes in circumstances
occur.
In 1973, the Illinois Supreme Court in Reese v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railway"6 followed NIPSCO in upholding the
loan receipt concept despite its admitted effect of thwarting the
rule of no contribution between joint tort feasors which prevailed
in Illinois. That case was an FELA wrongful death action against
the decedent's employer and the manufacturer of a crane which
struck and killed decedent. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs and the
railroad entered into a loan agreement, with repayment to be made
from the proceeds of any judgment obtained against the crane
manufacturer. Plaintiffs agreed to prosecute vigorously the action
against the remaining defendant. On plaintiffs' motion, the railroad
was dismissed without prejudice and trial resulted in a plaintiffs'
verdict against the crane manufacturer for $149,000.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court traced the development of
loan receipt agreements from their origins in marine cases"' through
the present employment of such agreements in personal injury
cases. The court acknowledged the potential evils of a loan receipt
agreement, including: evading the Illinois contribution rules, giving
rise to inordinate cooperation between the agreeing defendant
and the plaintiff, and the shifting of the entire burden by one joint
tort feasor to another; but the court nevertheless upheld the agree-
255 Ind. 319, 264 N.E.2d 64 (1970).
s' 55 111. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
37 Loan receipt agreements developed in response to efforts by carriers and
bailees to inequitably shift the burden of loss that was properly theirs to the in-
surance carrier of the shipper. By advancing funds to the shipper pending the out-
come of the shipper's suit against the carrier, the insurer would compensate the
shipper for his loss and be in a position to be reimbursed.
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ment. In doing so, the court asserted that such agreements had the
salutary effects of immediately placing funds in the hands of the
injured plaintiff, tending to simplify complex litigation and foster-
ing settlement. Adequate protection for the non-agreeing party
could be provided, in the court's opinion, by revelation of the
agreement to the jury and affording the adverse parties the op-
portunity of full and complete cross-examination to develop any
bias created by the arrangement.
In his dissent, in which he was joined by two of his fellow
justices, Justice Schaefer argued that loan receipt agreements
undermine the longstanding doctrine prohibiting assignment of
causes of action for personal injury or wrongful death. He also
distinguished the prior use of loan receipt agreements in marine
insurance cases in which a contract relationship existed between
the shipper and the insurer, and an advance by the insurer was
simply advance payment of a contract obligation. No such con-
tractual obligation exists in a personal injury case and, therefore,
in Judge Schaefer's view, none of the prior loan receipt cases
constituted authority for upholding the agreement. Rather than
limiting litigation, the dissent argued that the loan receipt agreement
fostered litigation since the plaintiff covenanted to pursue vigorously
litigation against the remaining party. Also, such an agreement
could be used by a more blameworthy defendant to coerce settle-
ment by or shift responsibility to a less culpable defendant.
Most of the recent cases that have considered the validity of
loan agreements have tended to reject them on various theories.
In Biven v. Charlie's Hobby Shop," the agreement was found to be
a partial release and valid only as such. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals concluded, following a rationale of the Reese dissent, that
a true loan receipt agreement must be based on a pre-existing con-
tract such as existed in the marine cases. In the Kansas decision
of Cullen v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe," the court rejected
arguments that a loan agreement amounted to maintenance and
champerty. The Kansas Supreme Court also declared it was not a
release of all defendants, nor was it an assignment of a cause of
action for personal injuries. The loan agreement did, however,
8 500 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1973).
"1211 Kan. 368, 507 P.2d 353 (1973).
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violate the Kansas rule against contribution among joint tort feasors
and, for that reason, it was rejected. The most recent judicial
decree, also rejecting loan receipt agreements, is the case of Monjay
v. Evergreen."0 The Washington Court of Appeals in Monjay cited
numerous grounds for its ruling, including the potentially coercive
effect, the presence of overtones of champerty, the absence of
historical support for the adaptation of the loan receipt agreement
in personal injury cases, and the fact that such agreements violate
the Washington rule prohibiting contribution among joint tort
feasors.
III. OTHER DECISIONS
Courts in other jurisdictions have considered problems similar
to guarantee and loan agreements which do not fit categorically
into either classification. The South Dakota case of Degnan v.
Beyman"' involved a boating accident with suit against the boat
owner and manufacturer. The operator settled with the plaintiff
during trial for $65,000 but remained in the case pursuing an
indemnity right against the manufacturer. The jury returned a
substantial verdict in the plaintiff's favor against both defendants,
and also found in favor of the operator against the manufacturer
on the operator's indemnity claim.
On the authority of Lum v. Stinnett, the South Dakota Supreme
Court reversed, citing the unfairness and prejudice to the non-
settling defendant when the jury was not apprised of all of the
facts. The court was concerned by the fact that the jury was
presented with "benevolent candor"' from a joint tort feasor, who
at the outset of the litigation was defending himself vigorously, yet
during argument urged liability as to himself and the co-defendant
with the suggestion that a substantial verdict be returned in favor
of the plaintiff.
In Weems v. Freeman,' the Georgia Supreme Court held that
an agreement entered into during trial and termed by the parties
a covenant not to sue was in reality a covenant not to execute,
40 13 Wash. App. 654, 537 P.2d 825 (1975).
4186 S.D. 598, 200 N.W.2d 134 (1972).
4Id. at 139.
'234 Ga. 575, 216 S.E.2d 774 (1975).
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which in Georgia law amounted to a general release. The effect of
the, agreement was, therefore, a release of all defendants.
Daniel v. Penrod Drilling" is a federal district court opinion
interpreting Louisiana law. During the course of the trial the
plaintiff and one defendant entered into an oral agreement which
provided that the defendant would receive a dismissal at the con-
clusion of the evidence in exchange for not resisting the plaintiff's
case, particularly insofar as damages were concerned. The agree-
ment was made known to the other parties and the court near
the close of trial, but the jury was not apprised of the situation.
The court withheld submitting any issues to the jury against the
agreeing defendant, but also withheld granting the motion to dis-
miss. Following the verdict against the remaining defendant only;
the judge granted a new trial. He based his ruling on what he
termed the need for integrity of the judicial process and total
candor with the jury. In rather colorful language, the judge pointed
out that the courts were not merely arenas where games of counsels'
skill were played, noting, "Even in football, we do not tolerate
point shaving."' Citing many of the leading decisions interpreting
Mary Carter agreements, Judge Rubin relied heavily on the at-
torney's duty in our adversary system to give his best without secret
equivocation. The judge noted that while an attorney, in represent-
ing his client, may not have an obligation to disclose the whole
truth, he does have a duty not to deceive the trier of fact and an
obligation not to hide the facts behind a facade."
CONCLUSION
Although various agreements may contain different phraseology
and the terms and circumstances vary, all of the arrangements
present the same basic situation, namely, a conditional settlement
with a possible reimbursement or shifting of the payment responsi-
bility, the benefits of which inure to one defendant at the expense
of another. Some of the agreements contain the added element of
continuation in the litigation by the agreeing party as an apparent
defendant, but with the pragmatic desire of furthering the plain-
4393 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. La. 1975).
45 Id. at 1060.
I Id. at 1061.
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tiff's interest and, in many instances, increasing the plaintiff's ver-
dict against a co-defendant.
Advocates of these accords stress the fact that they foster settle-
ment and lead to the early disposition of injury cases. This being
one of the primary desires of our judicial system, anything that
contributes to private settlements is to be encouraged. Such agree-
ments are of particular advantage in cases in which one defendant
recognizes the merits of the plaintiff's case and aspires to settle,
while one or more of the other defendants, for whatever reason,
refuse to consider the realities of the case.
It is obviously a distinct tactical advantage to the plaintiff to be
guaranteed or loaned a specific sum and still be permitted to prose-
cute his suit against all defendants without the jury being advised
that one or more of the defendants have entered into a settlement.
It is also argued that the use of such agreements can simplify
complicated litigation by eliminating certain parties or issues, allow-
ing the court, counsel, and the jury to concentrate more fully on
fewer and simpler issues.
It is further noted that even in the absence of any agreement,
the plaintiff is free to concentrate his efforts on one defendant
while others may play a passive role. Inadequate or no insurance
coverage, or clear liability as to one defendant, may result in that
defendant maintaining a low profile while the plaintiff directs his
case at others. Therefore, the complained of plaintiff-defendant
cooperation is not new or uncommon.
Finally, another positive effect of such agreements is the making
available to the plaintiff funds, or the guarantee of funds, which
make it possible to continue the litigation. In the absence of such
arrangements, many plaintiffs for lack of funds would be prevented
from pursuing an otherwise just case, thereby going uncompensated.
On the other hand, opponents of the agreements point to their
vices, stressing primarily the potential for collusive action. Courts
and commentators emphasize the fact that the first consideration
must be the integrity of the trial process, and that it is the search
for truth that, in the final analysis, affords justice to the litigants.
Agreements which have as one their effects misleading the court
or the trier of fact cannot be tolerated. In particular, secret agree-
ments receive the most criticism. Such agreements present the jury
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with an incomplete picture of the relationships of the parties and
make it impossible to evaluate fully testimony, argument, or the
court's instructions.
It is also argued that rather than reducing litigation by fostering
settlements, these types of agreements actually perpetuate litigation
since nearly all of them require the plaintiff to continue his case
against the non-agreeing defendants. A typical loan agreement
requires that the plaintiff pursue his action with repayment from
the proceeds of his recovery against the non-agreeing defendant.
Guarantee agreements contemplate payment by the guaranteeing
party only if the plaintiff fails to obtain the agreed upon amount
from the co-defendants.
The coercive effect of such agreements is the objection of some
courts. They cite instances in which the culpable defendant uses
the strategic advantage of a pre-trial agreement to shift the total
responsibility to a defendant with very little responsibility, thus
placing the relatively blameless defendant in the position of settling
or assuming the risk of a large adverse verdict. This result is
particularly likely in a situation in which the less culpable defendant
is the only defendant and the case involves a totally innocent and
seriously injured plaintiff.
Many cases stress the fact that these agreements frustrate the
established rules against permitting contribution among joint tort
feasors. Whatever the arguments against such a contribution rule
may be, many courts have determined that such agreements are
contrary to established contribution rules.
Some courts challenge the arrangements as constituting main-
tenance or champerty in which a stranger to the litigation officiously
intermeddles to assist in the prosecution or defense of the case,
either for profit (champerty) or other reasons (maintenance).
Finally, in instances involving secret accords, courts have relied
on ethical and moral considerations in striking them down by
describing them as fraudulent, in violation of public policy, and
involving professional misconduct of those involved.
As to how the courts will view agreements of this type in the
future, it seems clear from the authorities cited that candor and
fairness will be the guiding considerations. The Florida courts,
which gave life to the Mary Carter agreements, have in recent
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years modified their position and now consider it prejudicial error
to deny discovery and/or admissibility of such agreements. Most
recent decisions emphasize the need for presenting a true factual
picture to the jury. In line with this philosophy, it is likely that
future cases will require not only revelation of the arrangement to
the jury, but will also require that it be done in a way that is
fair to the non-agreeing party. This will require either an edited
version of a prejudiciously drafted agreement or explicit instruc-
tions from the court. To do otherwise would place the non-agreeing
defendant in a potentially prejudicial situation in which the jury is
allowed to review an agreement describing the defendant's bad
faith, unreasonable refusal to settle, and culpability.
In two recent California decisions, River Garden Farms v.
Superior Court" and Lareau v. Southern Pacific," the element of
good faith was stressed in cases concerning apportionment of set-
tlements. Although not involving agreements of the type discussed
in this article, both decisions dwell on the need for good faith
in settlement agreements among less than all of the defendants. In
Lareau, the court specifically invited the aggrieved party to litigate
the question of the good faith apportionment of funds paid in
partial settlement to the plaintiff by the other defendants.
A substantial majority of the courts that have treated this subject
have expressed some degree of reservation with regard to such
agreements. It seems fair to state that, in general, courts do not
favor such agreements and in all likelihood will continue to find
ways to reject them. It is highly doubtful that an agreement such
as the original Mary Carter agreement will ever be sustained by
any court. It is also unlikely that in any case of first impression a
court will look with favor upon an agreement, the terms of which
contemplate the settling or guaranteeing party remaining in the
case as an apparently viable defendant.
In jurisdictions following the common law rule of no contribu-
tion, such agreements, and particularly loan receipt agreements,
face an uncertain future. Although the holdings are not unanimous
and some courts have upheld them, the trend of the recent decisions
casts considerable doubt on their validity in no-contribution juris-
' 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (3d Dist. 1972).
4144 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1st Dist. 1975)'.
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dictions. In jurisdictions permitting contribution, the test will be
whether the agreeing parties acted in good faith.
Since questions of ethics, morality, and fairness do not appear
to be considered in cases in which the agreements are entered into
well. in advance of trial and the agreeing defendant is dismissed
from the lawsuit, the major objection to the agreements is missing.
Obviously, such agreements will receive a far more receptive hear-
ing from a court, and the proponents of the agreement will be met
with the more technical and less emotional objections.
One possible approach to handling such agreements may be
found in the philosophical approach giving rise to the rule of
comparative negligence. This would involve the submission of all
of the issues to the jury for their consideration. In states following
the rule of comparative negligence or comparative conduct, the
jury is frequently required to consider the conduct of all of the
parties and apportion responsibility among the defendants, as well
as the plaintiff. This procedure could also be employed in cases
involving pre-trial agreements calling for partial payment by one
of the defendants. The terms of the agreement could be presented
to the jury as one more element for them to consider in arriving at
the total amount of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled
and how these damages are to be apportioned. Such an approach
would have the benefit of total candor with the jury, and would
eliminate the potentially misleading situation of the case being
presented to the jury with less than all of the defendants present
and without an adequate explanation of their absence.
It seems obvious that the future of guarantee loan receipt and
other similar agreements will depend on considerations of candor,
fairness, and good faith. Agreements which do not meet these
standards and which result in unfairness by way of prejudice to
the non-agreeing party, or unfair advantage to the agreeing parties,
may well run the risk of judicial rejection.

